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Vogele: Associational Discrimination

ASSOCIATIONAL DISCRIMINATION: HOW FAR CAN IT GO?
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION,
SECOND DEPARTMENT
Chiara v. Town of New Castle1
(Decided January 14, 2015)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In January 2015, the New York State Appellate Division,
Second Department, held in Chiara v. Town of New Castle that a person may claim membership in a protected class for an employment
discrimination claim based upon his spouse’s religion under the New
York State Human Rights Law.2 In other words, according to the
Second Department, religion-based associational discrimination is actionable in the State of New York.3 However, it is unclear how the
court came to this conclusion because the court relied only on two
federal cases that upheld race-based Title VII associational discrimination4 and did not bridge the gap between race-based and religionbased claims or explain whether such claims have the same analysis.
The question remains whether there are different legal standards for
different types of associational discrimination.
II.

CHIARA FACTS

Petitioner Jeffrey Chiara worked as a highway laborer and
later as a machine equipment operator for the Town of New Castle
(the “Town”) for fifteen years.5 Though not Jewish himself, Chiara
experienced anti-Semitic harassment throughout his employment because his coworkers knew that he was married to a Jewish woman.6
1
2
3
4
5
6

2 N.Y.S.3d 132 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2015).
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 134-35.
Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 134-35.
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One of his coworkers, Michael Molnar, repeatedly made highly offensive, discriminatory remarks to Chiara, even though Chiara complained to his supervisors and asked Molnar to stop.7 After one particularly vehement confrontation in May 2002, which resulted in
Molnar being reprimanded and given separate work assignments,
Chiara claimed that his supervisors and coworkers continued to harass him until Chiara was terminated in 2007.8 He was called a “Jew
lover” and overheard offensive comments such as, “Oh, that Jew will
never get a job here” and references to yeshivas as “Jew farms.”9
III.

CHIARA PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In January 2005, Chiara commenced an action in the trial
court for employment discrimination and hostile work environment10
under New York State law11 against the Town, Michael Molnar, and
the Commissioner of the Department of Public Works.12 Chiara
amended his complaint in July 2006 to add the Town Administrator
as a defendant and to include additional allegations.13 While this action was ongoing in the trial court, the Town filed disciplinary charges against Chiara for seven instances of misconduct and insubordination in the workplace.14 These charges included, among others, the
use of inappropriate language toward a supervisor, an unexcused absence at a departmental meeting, and the use of work time for personal business.15 After an administrative hearing in September 2006,
he was found guilty of five out of the seven charges of misconduct
and was terminated on March 28, 2007 as a result of these findings.16
Chiara was the only Town employee who received a notice of disciplinary charges pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 75, despite the
7

Id.
Id. at 135-38.
9 Id. at 137.
10 Id. at 135. The trial court dismissed Chiara’s cause of action for hostile work environment and the Second Department affirmed. Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 144. As the focus of this
case note is associational discrimination, the cause of action for hostile work environment is
not relevant to my analysis and will not be discussed any further.
11 It is unclear to the author why Chiara did not also bring a federal Title VII claim. See
infra Part V.A.
12 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 135.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
8
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fact that other employees had allegedly acted inappropriately and unlawfully during the same time period.17 He contended that the disciplinary charges were brought against him in retaliation for the discrimination claim that he brought against the Town, Michael Molnar,
the Commissioner of the Department of Public Works, and the Town
Administrator (hereinafter “Defendants”) in the trial court18 and noted that the supervisors who had made the anti-Semitic remarks
throughout his employment were the same supervisors who testified
against him at the hearing that resulted in his termination.19
In October 2011, Defendants moved for summary judgment
in the trial court on the ground that Chiara could not establish a prima
facie case for employment discrimination.20 Specifically, Defendants
argued that Chiara was not a member of a protected class and was
terminated for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.21 In opposition, Chiara contended that he was a member of a protected class due
to his marriage to a Jewish woman and that Defendants also violated
his constitutional right to intimate association.22 Additionally, Chiara
argued that there was ample evidence to show that his termination
was based, at least in part, on discrimination.23 Nonetheless, the trial
court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and specifically held that “[t]he contention by plaintiff, that he was . . . discriminated against by the Town, based on his wife’s religion, is nothing
more than conjecture.”24
Chiara appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department,25 which considered whether a claim of discrimination based
upon the religion of a spouse (religion-based associational discrimination) is allowable under the New York State Human Rights Law.26
This was a case of first impression for the Second Department.27
Though federal courts have allowed claims for associational discrim-

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 138.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 136.
Id.
Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 137.
Id.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 134.
Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 134.
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ination based on race,28 the extension of associational discrimination
claims to religion had not yet been determined in New York until
Chiara.29
IV.

SECOND DEPARTMENT’S DISCUSSION IN CHIARA

Since there is a lack of authority under the New York State
Human Rights Law to support a claim of discrimination based upon a
spouse’s religion, the Second Department in Chiara first considered
federal cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter “Title VII”),30 which prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”31 In that regard, the Second Department analyzed an
Eleventh Circuit case, Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co.,32
and a Second Circuit case, Holcomb v. Iona College,33 both of which
held that an employee who experiences adverse action in the workplace due to his employer’s disapproval of his interracial marriage
has a cognizable claim for employment discrimination under Title
VII.34 Though the plaintiffs in both cases were white, they nonetheless experienced discrimination based on their associations with African American women and thus had claims based on associational discrimination.35 In Chiara, the Second Department found that Chiara
was a member of the protected class by virtue of his association with
his Jewish wife.36 Thus, he had standing to sue for religious discrimination, even though the discrimination was not directed at his religion but rather his wife’s religion.37 In addition to associational discrimination, the court briefly noted that Chiara’s supervisors
infringed upon Chiara’s First Amendment right to intimate associa-

28

See generally Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins., 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1986).
Thomas K. Johnson II & Betina Miranda, The Company You Keep: Associational Discrimination, LAW360 (Oct. 22, 2008), https://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/c1e130eda040-407b-b70c-066a51644516/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/45e98e2c-feab-47cbb44d-0cd6e2a1290c/The%20Company%20You%20Keep%20Associational%20Discrimination.pdf.
30 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
32
791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1986).
33 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
34 Id. at 131-32; Parr, 791 F.2d at 892.
35 Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 131-32; Parr, 791 F.2d at 892.
36 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 141.
37 Id. at 140-41.
29
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tion.38
The Second Department further held that Chiara “raised a triable issue of fact” as to whether his termination was motivated, at
least in part, by discrimination when he presented evidence at trial
that some of his supervisors, with the knowledge that his wife was
Jewish, made “anti-Semitic remarks in his presence” and then testified against him in the disciplinary hearing that led to his termination.39 Since the court found that Chiara was indeed “a member of a
protected class by virtue of his marriage to” his Jewish wife,40 the
Second Department held that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ summary judgment motion and that the factfinder should have
decided whether the disciplinary charges and termination were motivated by discrimination based on his protected status.41
V.

ASSOCIATIONAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII

Although the court in Chiara held that religion-based associational discrimination is actionable under the New York State Human
Rights Law,42 it did not provide an adequate explanation for this
holding. In its decision, the Second Department focused on two federal Title VII cases because of the dearth of New York case law addressing associational discrimination,43 and because the standards for
recovery under state law are similar to the federal standards.44 These
two federal cases upheld only race-based associational discrimination and did not address whether the rationale behind such claims applies analogously to other associational discrimination claims, such
as those based on religion, sex, or national origin.45 For example, the
court in Parr held that “[w]here a plaintiff claims discrimination
38

Id. at 141.
Id. at 142.
40 Id. at 137; 141.
41 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 143.
42 Id. at 141.
43 Id. at 140.
44 Stephenson v. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union Local 100, 811 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636
(2006) (explaining that under both federal law and New York State law, the standard of recovery for employment discrimination consists of the following three-step framework: 1)
The plaintiff must initially demonstrate its prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence; 2) “The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case”
by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s termination; and 3)
The burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant’s reasons for the termination are pretextual).
45 Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 140.
39
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based upon an interracial marriage or association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated against because of his race.”46
The court in Chiara did not acknowledge the lack of reference to religion-based associational discrimination claims in the two federal
cases.47 Thus, it did not bridge the gap to show that a person who is
discriminated against based on his marriage to someone of another
religion is discriminated against because of his own religion.48
Federal and state courts have not considered claims for associational discrimination based on sex, national origin, or religion as
frequently as those based on race.49 Additionally, federal courts have
disagreed as to the proper standard for the right to intimate association, and it is thus unclear under which circumstances the right to intimate association applies.50 The court in Chiara did not address this
lack of precedent or obscure history and instead made its decision on
an assumption that the logic behind race-based and religion-based associational claims are interchangeable.51 Therefore, it is crucial to
first understand the history of Title VII associational discrimination
and the constitutional right to intimate association in order to fully
appreciate the implications of the Chiara case in New York and nationwide.
A.

Case Law Regarding Race-Based Associational
Discrimination

Title VII provides, in relevant part, that it is “unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”52 The statute plainly prohibits discrimination based upon an individual’s own protected class status,
but it does not explicitly address whether an individual’s association
or relationship with a protected third party may give rise to a discrim46

Parr, 791 F.2d at 892.
See Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d 132.
48 Id.
49
Johnson II & Miranda, supra note 29.
50 See Lyng v. Int’l Union, United Auto., 485 U.S. 360, 364-65 (1988); see also Adkins v.
Bd. Of Educ., 982 F.2d 952, 956 (6th Cir. 1993); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
617-18 (1984).
51 See Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d 132.
52 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
47
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ination claim.53 For many years, federal courts, based on a strict construction of Title VII, did not allow associational discrimination as a
cognizable claim.54 For example, an Alabama federal district court in
Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.55 held that a white individual was unable
to bring a racial discrimination claim under Title VII based upon his
association with black employees because he was not a “ ‘person aggrieved’ within the contemplation of the Act” and thus lacked standing.56 A Georgia district court in Adams v. Governor’s Committee on
Postsecondary Education,57 citing to Ripp, came to a similar conclusion, holding that “[n]either the language of the statute nor its legislative history supports a cause of action for discrimination against a
person because of his relationship to persons of another race.”58
In 1986, the Eleventh Circuit in Parr took a broader approach
to Title VII.59 In that case, the plaintiff, a white male, was interviewed for a position as an insurance salesman at Woodmen of the
World Life Insurance, but was not hired after the manager discovered
“that he was married to a black woman.”60 The Eleventh Circuit held
that a liberal construction of Title VII to include claims for racebased associational discrimination would further the laudable goals of
equal opportunity and protection in the workplace.61 To support its
determination, the court looked to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), an agency charged with the enforcement
of Title VII and other federal laws that prohibit workplace discrimination, whose decisions have consistently allowed claims for racebased associational discrimination.62 The Parr court also cited to the
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co.,63 which
stated that Title VII provides a clear mandate that racial discrimination will not be tolerated in any form or under any circumstances, in
light of the nation’s history of deeply entrenched racial tensions.64
53

Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, 173 F.3d 988, 993 (6th Cir. 1999).
See Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 208-09 (N.D. Ala. 1973); see also
Adams v. Governor’s Comm. On Postsecondary Educ., No. C80-624A, 1981 WL 27101, at
*3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 1981).
55 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
56 Id. at 208-09.
57 Adams, 1981 WL 27101, at *3.
58 Id. (citing Ripp, 366 F. Supp. at 205).
59
Parr, 791 F.2d at 892.
60 Id. at 889.
61 Id. at 892.
62 Id.
63 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
64 Id. at 891.
54
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Parr was one of the first decisions in a series of federal circuit
court cases that liberally construed Title VII to allow associational
race-based discrimination.65 A little over ten years later, the Sixth
Circuit in Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac66 upheld the plaintiff’s associational discrimination claim based on his association with his biracial daughter.67 The plaintiff, a white male, was an automobile
dealership finance manager who had received praise from his boss
and coworkers for his excellent job performance—until his biracial
daughter visited him at work.68 After this visit, the plaintiff’s boss
began to ridicule and berate him.69 The plaintiff had even overheard
his boss’s statements over the telephone that the plaintiff’s mixed
race child was “going to hurt his [boss’s] image in the community
and his dealership.”70 The plaintiff was later discharged after he exchanged heated words with his boss.71 The Sixth Circuit held that the
plaintiff had a racial employment discrimination claim based on his
association with his biracial daughter because “[a] white employee
who is discharged because his child is biracial is discriminated
against on the basis of his race, even though the root animus for the
discrimination is a prejudice against the biracial child.”72 Though the
court acknowledged that it is unclear whether Title VII applies to
both direct and associational discrimination,73 it nonetheless upheld
the associational discrimination claim based on the statute’s purpose
of eliminating discrimination in the workplace.74
In 2008, the Second Circuit in Holcomb similarly permitted a
claim of race-based associational discrimination.75 The plaintiff, a
white male, was the Iona College men’s basketball team assistant
coach, who experienced discrimination based on his marriage to an
African American woman.76 In that regard, the college’s director of
athletics changed a policy concerning alumni special events and pregame and post-game parties by prohibiting high school players and
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

See Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994; see also Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 131-32.
173 F.3d 988 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 994.
Id. at 990.
Id.
Id.
Tetro, 175 F.3d at 990-91.
Id. at 994 (emphasis added).
Id. at 994-95.
Id. at 995.
Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 132.
Id.
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others who were neither donors nor alumni, like the plaintiff’s wife,
from attending future events.77 Since the plaintiff’s wife was black,
and the high school players who attended these events were also predominantly black, the plaintiff suspected that the director’s motive
was to appeal to white alumni for donations to the school by limiting
the number of African Americans in attendance.78 Additionally, the
plaintiff repeatedly overheard one of the college vice presidents making racist comments about African Americans.79 On one particular
occasion, after this college vice president received an invitation to the
plaintiff’s wedding, he asked the plaintiff, “[Y]ou’re really going to
marry that Aunt Jemima? You really are a nigger lover.”80 The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff was a member of a protected class
for the purposes of the discrimination suit because, “where an employee is subjected to adverse action because an employer disapproves of interracial association, the employee suffers discrimination
because of the employee’s own race.”81 In other words, if the plaintiff and his wife had both been black, the plaintiff would not have
suffered discrimination based on an interracial relationship.82 It was
the fact that his skin color was different from his wife’s skin color
that caused the discrimination in this case.83 The court noted that
many district courts in the Second Circuit have agreed with this broad
view of protected classes under Title VII.84
B.

Why Non-Race-Based Associational Discrimination
Claims Have Not Been Similarly Permitted

Federal and state courts have not considered associational discrimination claims based on sex, national origin, religion, or other
protected classes as frequently as those based on race.85 This may be
due, in part, to the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as this Act
was enacted primarily to combat the rampant racial discrimination

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 133-34.
Id. at 133-34, 142-43.
Id. at 133-34.
Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 134.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Johnson II & Miranda, supra note 29.
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that occurred across the country for centuries.86 Additionally, the low
number of lawsuits per year for associational discrimination based on
sex, national origin, religion, or other protected classes suggests that
courts simply do not receive these types of cases and therefore, they
do not have the opportunity to consider these issues as frequently as
race-based associational discrimination issues.87
1.

The History of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

The first possible explanation for the lack of precedential
support to extend non-race-based associational discrimination claims
under Title VII is that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the very act that
contains Title VII, was created primarily in response to race discrimination and helped to further the social movements of desegregation,
workplace opportunity, and voting equality for African Americans
across the country.88 President John F. Kennedy, in his nationwide
address regarding civil rights on June 11, 1963, called upon Congress
to enact legislation to eliminate discrimination against African Americans, declaring that “in too many communities, in too many parts of
the country, wrongs are inflicted on Negro citizens and there are no
remedies at law.89 Unless the Congress acts, their only remedy is in
the streets.”90 Not one mention of religious discrimination was made
in his speech, and this is understandable, considering that the backdrop of his speech was the desegregation of the University of Alabama, where Kennedy had deployed National Guard troops to protect
two African American students as they enrolled at the school.91 A little more than a year later, upon signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
President Lyndon B. Johnson remarked:
We believe that all men are entitled to the blessings of
liberty. Yet millions are being deprived of those
blessings—not because of their own failures, but be86 Civil Rights Act, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/civil-rights-act
(last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
87 Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2015, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited June 21,
2016).
88 HISTORY, supra note 86.
89 President John F. Kennedy, Address on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963) (transcript available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3375).
90 Id.
91 Id.
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cause of the color of their skin. The reasons are deeply imbedded in history and tradition and the nature of
man. We can understand—without rancor or hatred—
how this all happened.92
The Act was primarily motivated by racial—not religious—tensions
during the tumultuous 1960s, and the force behind Kennedy’s and
Johnson’s words was the immediate need for anti-discrimination legislation.
2.

Statistical Data for Non-Race-Based
Discrimination Cases

The second possible explanation for the lack of precedential
support to extend non-race-based associational discrimination claims
under Title VII is that courts simply have not yet considered many of
these types of cases. Indeed, claims filed based on religion, color, or
national origin are not as common as claims based on race.93 The
EEOC determined that for fiscal year 2015, 34.7% of all employment
discrimination charges were based on racial discrimination, compared
to a mere 3.9% for religious discrimination, 3.2% for color, and
10.6% for national origin.94 If there are fewer cases that address religion, color, or national origin discrimination in general, then there are
fewer chances that associational discrimination based on religion,
color, or national origin will come before the court.95
C.

Reasons to Extend Associational Discrimination
Law

Though claims for associational discrimination on bases other
than race have not been frequently considered, courts should extend
associational claims to these other protected classes. First, Title VII
should be liberally construed to include associational claims in order
to uphold its purpose to protect employees from many types of discrimination in the workplace.96 Second, although it is currently “an
unsettled legal question whether” associational discrimination claims
92

President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill (July 2,
1964), (transcript available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3525)
93 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 87.
94 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 87
95 See discussion of sex-based associational discrimination infra Part V.C.2.
96 Culpepper, 421 F.2d at 891.
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based on sex should be actionable, such a consideration at the federal
level may open the door to consideration and approval of other types
of associational discrimination claims as well, such as those based on
religion.97 Third, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) explicitly prohibits associational discrimination based on disabilities,98
and its broad allowance of such actions should be used as a guide in
associational actions brought under Title VII. Fourth, the logic used
in race-based associational discrimination cases, which have held that
a plaintiff in a biracial relationship is discriminated against based on
his own race,99 can be applied with equal force to religion-based associational discrimination cases. Finally, the EEOC has interpreted
Title VII to encompass all types of associational discrimination
claims, including those based on religion,100 and its interpretation
should be given “great deference” in federal courts.101
1.

Title VII Liberal Construction

Regardless of the low numbers of non-race-based associational discrimination claims, courts should liberally construe Title VII
claims in order to further the purpose of the statute, which is to combat discrimination in the workplace.102 In fact, the Fifth Circuit in
Culpepper held that “[i]t is . . . the duty of the courts to make sure
that the Act works, and the intent of Congress is not hampered by a
combination of a strict construction of the statute and a battle with
semantics.”103 This justification for race-based associational claims
applies to other non-race associational discrimination claims as well.
Indeed, numerous courts have considered sex-based associational
discrimination claims and have made comparisons to race-based
claims, though no court, to date, has explicitly permitted sex-based
associational claims.104

97

Gallo v. W.B. Mason Co., No. CIV.A. 10-10618-RWZ, 2010 WL 4721064, at *1 (D.
Mass. Nov. 15, 2010).
98 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2012).
99 Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139; Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994; Parr, 791 F.2d at 892.
100 EEOC Compliance Manual, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
101 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
102 Culpepper, 421 F.2d at 891.
103 Id.
104 See generally Stezzi v. Aramark Sports, LLC, No. CIV.A. 07-5121, 2009 WL 2356866
(E.D. Pa. July 30, 2009); see also Gallo, 2010 WL 4721064.
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Sex-Based Associational Discrimination
Claims

Currently, it is unsettled whether courts should liberally construe Title VII to extend associational discrimination to sex-based
claims.105 The EEOC was once inclined to permit such an extension
in an employment discrimination ruling.106 In Cooke v. Nicholson,107
the plaintiff worked with a woman in the plumbing shop at the Veteran Affairs Medical Center.108 His coworkers repeatedly harassed him
for his association with the woman, as she was the only woman on
the entire plumbing staff.109 The case was ultimately remanded for a
reconsideration of the facts, but the EEOC first clarified that “[i]f the
alleged harassment incidents occurred and were based on the complainant’s association with [a woman] because of her gender and
happened as frequently as the complainant claims, a fact finder could
reasonably find unlawful sexual harassment against the complainant.”110 This statement implies an EEOC endorsement of associational discrimination based on sex and offers hope that an associational discrimination claim on a basis other than race may indeed be
cognizable under Title VII.
3.

ADA Associational Discrimination Claims

Associational discrimination is expressly prohibited under Title I of the ADA.111 The ADA is a federal law that forbids discrimination against individuals with disabilities in areas such as “employment, transportation, public accommodation, communications, and
governmental activities.”112 Unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Title I of the ADA has a provision that expressly protects
employees from associational discrimination, thus providing a clear
and unequivocal mandate that there is no tolerance for any “adverse
actions based on unfounded stereotypes and assumptions about indi105

Gallo, 2010 WL 4721064, at *1.
Cooke v. Nicholson, EEOC DOC 05A60305 (E.E.O.C.), 2006 WL 842209, at *4 (Mar.
23, 2006).
107 Id. at *1.
108
Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at *4-5.
111 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2012).
112 Americans
with
Disabilities
Act,
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/disability/ada.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
106
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viduals who associate with people who have disabilities.”113 In this
regard, the EEOC has clarified that ADA associational discrimination
claims are allowed even when the employee’s association or relationship with the disabled individual is not familial.114 For example, the
EEOC, on its “Questions and Answers” webpage regarding disability
associational discrimination, explained that a claim may be allowed if
an employee is terminated based on his contact with HIV-infected individuals at a homeless shelter where the employee volunteers in his
spare time.115 Claims may also be allowed in situations where employers do not want to pay “increased health insurance costs” associated with disabled dependents and where employers deny opportunities for advancement within the company due to an employee’s
“association with a person with a disability.”116 Title I offers a broad
take on associational discrimination, which can and should be applied
to Title VII claims based on religion.
4.

Bridging the Gap between Race-Based
Discrimination and Religion-Based
Discrimination

Generally, the reasoning used in race-based associational discrimination cases—that a plaintiff in a biracial relationship is discriminated against on the basis of his own race—can also be applied
to religion-based associational cases, in that a plaintiff in an interfaith
marriage may be discriminated against on the basis of his own religion. Even without such a comparison, Jews have historically been
viewed as having their own ethnicity or race,117 so it is arguable that
Chiara could have made a race-based associational claim based on
the fact his wife, as a Jewish person, is of a different ethnicity or race.
Either way, these arguments bridge the gap between race-based and
religion-based associational discrimination claims, thereby suggesting that courts should be more willing to consider and uphold religion-based associational discrimination claims on the ground that
they are akin to race-based associational discrimination claims.
113 Questions and Answers About the Association Provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/association_ada.html#_ftnref1 (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987).
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The logic applied in race-based associational discrimination
cases applies to religion-based associational claims. The courts in
Parr, Tetro, and Holcomb all held that discrimination against an individual based on his interracial relationship was, in fact, discrimination against that individual’s own race.118 In other words, an individual in an interracial relationship is discriminated against because his
own race does not match the race of his spouse. By the same logic,
discrimination against an individual based on his marriage to a Jewish person is discrimination against that individual’s own religion.
Although it is common today for Jews in the United States to marry
outside their faith,119 there still remains some opposition to this intermarriage in the United States.120 Indeed, most individuals do marry within their religion,121 just as most individuals marry within their
race.122 Therefore, a strong analogy can be made between the interfaith relationships between Jews and non-Jews and the interracial relationships of black and white individuals, as it is likely that someone
could discriminate against an individual for his or her association
with someone of another faith in the same way that someone can discriminate against an individual for his or her association with someone of another race.
Additionally, Jews have been historically classified as a separate race or ethnic group, not just as persons of a specific religion.123
In fact, courts have found that discrimination against Jewish persons
can rise to the level of racial discrimination, not just religious discrimination, for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981124 and
1982,125 both of which provide for equal rights under the law and are

118

Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139; Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994; Parr, 791 F.2d at 892.
Chapter 2: Intermarriage and Other Demographics, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 1,
2013),
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/10/01/chapter-2-intermarriage-and-otherdemographics/.
120 Intermarriage,
NEW
WORLD
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Intermarriage (last visited Apr. 6, 2016).
121 Caryle Murphy, Interfaith marriage is common in U.S., particularly among the recently wed, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jun. 2, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/06/02/interfaith-marriage/.
122
Mary Mederios Kent, Most Americans Marry Within Their Race, POPULATION
REFERENCE
BUREAU
(Aug.
2010),
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2010/usintermarriage.aspx.
123 Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617-18.
124 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
125 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012).
119
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analytically similar to Title VII retaliation claims.126 In Saint Francis
College v. Al-Khazraji,127 a university professor was discriminated
against on the basis of his Arabian ancestry.128 Though Arabs are
considered Caucasian “under current racial classifications,”129 the
U.S. Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that the professor had a
racial discrimination claim based on his Arabian ancestry.130 Specifically, the Court held:
Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry
or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is racial
discrimination that Congress intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be classified as racial in
terms of modern scientific theory.131
Like Arabs, Jews are not generally considered a separate race today,
but their history as a separate race still gives rise to racial discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981132 and 1982.133 Even so,
stigma against the marital mixing of Jews and non-Jews for racial or
ethnic reasons nevertheless exists in parts of the world, especially
among the Orthodox Jewish population, some of whom view intermarriage and the declining numbers of those who identify as Jewish
as a “Silent Holocaust.”134 As such, the fact that some Orthodox
Jews believe that intermarriage may diminish or destroy Jewish roots,
traditions, values, culture, and historical perspective suggests that
some still do identify as a separate race or ethnicity, despite popular
opinion to the contrary.135
Consequently, the logic used in Parr, Tetro, and Holcomb,
126 Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617-18; see also Saint Francis Coll. v. AlKhazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987).
127 Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 604.
128 Id. at 606.
129 Id. at 607.
130 Id. at 613.
131 Id.
132 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
133 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012).
134
Antony Lerman, Assimilation is Not a Dirty Word, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2009),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/sep/11/jewish-muslim-identityassimilation.
135 Nissan
Dovid Dubov, What is Wrong with Intermarriage?, CHABAD,
http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/108396/jewish/Intermarriage.htm (last visited
Mar. 20, 2016).
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which all held that discrimination against an individual’s interracial
marriage is discrimination against that individual’s own race,136 applies with equal force on religious as well as racial grounds to relationships between Jews and non-Jews. If an employee is discriminated against on the basis of his interfaith marriage, it can be argued that
the employee’s supervisor and/or coworkers do not like the mixing of
the two faiths and are therefore discriminating against the employee’s
own religion as it is associated with the spouse’s religion. This is the
same logic that has been consistently applied in many race-based associational cases.137 If Jews are considered a separate race or ethnicity, an employee may be able to bring a race-based associational discrimination if his or her spouse is Jewish and there is evidence that
the employee’s supervisor and/or coworkers are discriminating
against the employee on the ground that they view the employee and
his spouse as having different races or ethnicities. Regardless, even
absent the characterization of Jews as a separate race, associational
discrimination claims based on religion should still be cognizable under Title VII in any event.
5.

The EEOC

Finally, though Title VII contains no explicit provision recognizing a claim for religious discrimination based upon the religion of
a spouse, nor is there any case law in New York on the matter besides
Chiara, the EEOC has shed some light on associational discrimination under Title VII.138 According to the EEOC Compliance Manual,
“Title VII prohibits discrimination against an individual because s/he
is associated with another person of a particular religion.139 For example, it would be unlawful to discriminate against a Christian because s/he is married to a Muslim.”140 The manual also recognizes
associational claims based upon race, color, and national origin.141
Since the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the EEOC’s administrative guidance is entitled to “great deference,”142 courts should take
the EEOC’s interpretation into account as they begin to consider
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139; Tetro, 173 F.3d at 994; Parr, 791 F.2d at 892.
Id.
EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 100.
EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 100.
EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 100.
EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 100.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34.
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more non-race-based associational discrimination claims.
D.

Associational Discrimination in Chiara

The court in Chiara relied primarily upon Parr and Holcomb,
two race-based associational discrimination cases, but it is not clear
exactly how the court transplanted the reasoning from those cases to
the action before it. For example, Holcomb held that when a person
suffers discrimination on the basis of his interracial relationship or
association, he is discriminated against on the basis of his own
race.143 However, the court did not clarify whether Chiara suffered
discrimination on the basis of his own religion in relation to the religion of his spouse. On the one hand, Chiara claimed that he was
called a “Jew lover” throughout his employment,144 which indicates
that he was discriminated against on the basis of his own religion in
affiliation with his spouse’s religion. On the other hand, many of the
offensive comments were generalized and did not directly target Chiara or his association with a Jewish person at all. For example, Chiara’s supervisor, while in Chiara’s presence, referred to someone other than Chiara as “the fucking Jew.”145 The highway foreman, also
while in Chiara’s presence, “referred to a yeshiva as a ‘Jew farm’”
and pointed out that a passerby looked “like a Jew.”146 These are
mere generalizations, as they do not directly implicate Chiara or his
wife at all. Furthermore, the court did not mention Chiara’s own religion and instead referred to him as simply “not Jewish.”147 By doing so, the court did not emphasize the interfaith relationship and instead focused solely on the fact that Defendants viewed Jews as
distasteful and unpleasant people. Consequently, it is difficult to apply the logic of race-based associational discrimination cases to this
case when Defendants’ discriminatory comments were generalized
and did not focus on the association of Chiara’s religion and his
wife’s religion.
It is true that the court’s decision in Chiara is in line with the
contention that Title VII (and analytically similar state laws) should
be liberally construed in order to ensure that discrimination does not

143
144
145
146
147

Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139.
Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 137.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 134.
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take place in the workplace. However, the court’s specific reasoning
is unclear; even though it relied on federal cases that allowed racebased associational discrimination claims under Title VII, the Chiara
court failed to bridge the gap between race-based associational claims
and religion-based associational claims.
VI.

THE RIGHT TO INTIMATE ASSOCIATION

The court in Chiara briefly noted that “discrimination against
an individual based on his or her association with a member of a protected class also constitutes an infringement upon that individual’s
First Amendment right to intimate association, which receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty.”148 The court did
not explain the history of the right to intimate association, nor did it
explain its reasoning for this holding in detail.149 Before considering
why the Chiara court did not focus on the right to intimate association, it is first crucial to understand the history of the right to intimate
association both across the country and in the Second Circuit specifically.
A.

A Brief History of the Right to Intimate
Association

One of the first major decisions to hint at the right to intimate
association was the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Griswold v. Connecticut150 in 1965. In Griswold, the Court held that
a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives was unconstitutional because it encroached upon the right to marital privacy.151
After the Court surveyed a number of cases that upheld freedom of
association as a right to assemble or congregate, the Court also
acknowledged that the freedom of association was “more than the
right to attend a meeting.”152 In its concluding remarks, the Court
endorsed a right to privacy in intimate relationships, separate and
apart from the right to associate with a group or organization:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 141.
Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 141.
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
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Rights—older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to
the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for
as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.153
Indeed, the Court’s language in Griswold suggests a constitutional right to intimate association. However, it was not until twenty
years later in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees154 that the U.S. Supreme Court
expressly recognized the right to intimate association as its own constitutional doctrine.155 The Supreme Court in Roberts explicitly defined freedom of association as comprising two distinct prongs: (1)
the right “to enter into and maintain certain intimate” relationships
without undue interference from the State, and (2) the right to associate with others in order to engage in constitutionally-protected expressive activities, such as speech and assembly. 156 Although the
right to intimate association was never before explicitly recognized
by name, the Court noted that courts across the country have long
acknowledged that the protection of intimate relationships from undue state intrusion is central to the concept of individual freedom.157
The Court further held that the freedom of association is necessary to
safeguard the “certain kinds of personal bonds [that] have played a
critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation.”158
Subsequent circuit court and district court decisions have not
agreed on the constitutional source of the right to intimate association.159 While the U.S. Supreme Court in Roberts alluded to the right
as one rooted in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,160 the Court later suggested in another case, City of Dallas v.
Stanglin,161 that it is a component of a generalized right of association
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

Id. at 486.
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
Id. at 617-18.
Id.
Id. at 618-19.
Id.
See Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1999).
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19.
490 U.S. 19 (1989).
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from the First Amendment.162 The Chiara decision also referred to
freedom of intimate association as a First Amendment right.163
It is likely that the right to intimate association has a combination of constitutional sources, depending on the issues of a particular
case. Additionally, even the standard for determining whether the
right has been violated has varied among cases that have considered
the issue.164 Some courts have held that the right to intimate association is violated when an adverse action will terminate the intimate relationship in question,165 while others have suggested that the right is
violated only when there is “an ‘undue intrusion’ by the state.”166
Regardless, at a minimum, the right is restricted to relationships of an
extremely close nature that “attend the creation and sustenance of a
family—marriage, childbirth, the raising and education of children,
and cohabitation with one’s relatives.”167 Specifically, the Second
Circuit in Patel v. Searles168 noted that there is “a sliding scale for determining the amount of constitutional protection an association deserves,” which suggests that the most intimate relationships—such as
familial relationships—will always receive more protection than less
intimate ones, such as friendships or coworker relationships.169
The Second Circuit has upheld a right to intimate association
as it relates to race-based associational discrimination.170 In Matusick
v. Erie County Water Authority,171 the plaintiff, a white male, was an
employee of a public entity, the Erie County Water Authority
(“ECWA”).172 In 2004, some of the plaintiff’s coworkers learned that
he was recently engaged to a black woman.173 The plaintiff’s supervisor repeatedly made racist comments and harassed him by throwing
“lawn equipment [onto] his roof and duct-tap[ing] his door shut.”174
On one occasion, the supervisor called the plaintiff a “nigger lover”
and threatened to “kill all the fucking [niggers].”175 Other coworkers
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

Id.
Chiara, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 141.
See Adler, 185 F.3d at 43-44.
See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 364-65.
See Adkins, 982 F.2d at 956.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619 (citations omitted).
305 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 136.
Matusick v. Erie Cty. Water Auth., 757 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2014).
757 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 38.
Matusick, 757 F.3d at 38.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 4 [2016], Art. 13

942

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 32

had also repeatedly made racist comments to the plaintiff, even
though the plaintiff had made it clear that he found the comments to
be offensive.176 He was terminated after a series of disciplinary
charges.177 Thereafter, he sued the ECWA and individual defendants,
alleging, in part, unlawful discrimination and disparate treatment regarding the disciplinary charges and subsequent termination.178
The Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had a right to
intimate association under the First Amendment, holding that “[t]he
ECWA had no legitimate interest in interfering with” the plaintiff’s
relationship or terminating the plaintiff based upon his interracial relationship.179 However, in its holding, the court noted that the history
of the right to intimate association was muddled, and there were no
decisions from either the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit that
definitively extended the right to engaged couples.180 Due to this
ambiguity, the court concluded that since the right to intimate association for engaged couples was not clearly established at the time of
the discriminatory conduct, the defendants were not expected to
know the law and were therefore immune from liability.181
The Second Circuit in Matusick found it unnecessary to
choose a standard of review.182 Specifically, the court stated that
“[t]o interfere with Matusick’s constitutional right ‘on so unsupportable a basis as rac[e is] so directly subversive of’ the constitutional interests at stake, . . . that it cannot, under any circumstance we can
conceive of, be accepted.”183 The court explicitly held that there was
no need to choose whether a right to intimate association claim
should call for a strict, intermediate, or rational basis standard of
scrutiny, or whether a balancing test should be performed “to weigh
the relative interests of the plaintiff in preserving an intimate relationship and the interests of the state in ‘promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees,’ ” because ECWA
had no interest whatsoever in interfering with his relationship.184
This part of the decision is key for the following analysis of Chiara v.
176

Id.
Id. at 40-41.
178 Id. at 41.
179 Id. at 59-60 (emphasis omitted).
180
Matusick, 757 F.3d at 61.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 59.
183 Id. at 60 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398 (1978)).
184 Matusick, 757 F.3d at 59 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968)).
177

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss4/13

22

Vogele: Associational Discrimination

2016

ASSOCIATIONAL DISCRIMINATION

943

Town of New Castle.
B.

The Right to Intimate Association as it Applies to
Chiara

The Second Department in Chiara did not discuss the right of
intimate association in great detail. Since the relationship between
Chiara and his wife was an intimate one, and the Town “had no legitimate interest in interfering with” that relationship through its discriminatory conduct, the right of intimate association clearly and unequivocally extended to him.185 As described in the Matusick case,186
there is no need to choose a standard of review or conduct a balancing test in order to determine whether the right to intimate association
has been violated when there is discrimination based on an intimate
association with someone of another religion. A town that discriminates against an employee simply because that employee associates
with a Jewish person does not, in any way, promote a public interest
that needs to be balanced against the employee’s interest in preserving the intimate relationship. Why the court only briefly mentioned
this argument may be due to the fact that the right to intimate association has a fuzzy history. Though the court had the opportunity to
clarify this history, it did not do so.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Second Department in Chiara did not provide an adequate explanation as to why non-race-based associational discrimination is actionable. It failed to address the lack of case law on Title
VII non-race-based associational discrimination and the race-charged
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, instead resting its decision
exclusively on two federal race-based associational discrimination
cases without any discussion of why race-based and religion-based
associational discrimination should be similarly addressed.
Despite this lack of explanation, there are five reasons why
associational claims should be extended to all the protected classes.
First, courts should liberally construe Title VII claims in order to further the purpose of combatting discrimination in the workplace.
Though Chiara brought his claim under state law, the Second De185
186

See generally Matusick, 757 F.3d at 59-60 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
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partment nonetheless analyzed federal Title VII cases because there
was a lack of authority under state law to support associational discrimination. If a state court relies on Title VII to support its decision,
then it should liberally construe Title VII to make sure “the intent of
Congress is not hampered by a combination of a strict construction of
the statute and a battle with semantics.”187 Since the court in Chiara
failed to explicitly address the necessity of Title VII liberal construction, it was unclear why there was a comparison between race-based
associational claims and religion-based associational claims. Second,
the EEOC in Cooke suggested an allowance of sex-based associational discrimination claims, offering an opening in the future for
permitting all associational discrimination claims. Third, there is
precedent for allowing non-race-based associational discrimination
claims under Title I of the American Disabilities Act, which expressly provides for the protection of employees from disability-based associational discrimination. As such, a strong argument can be made
that the logic of such ADA claims can and should be applied to nonrace-based Title VII claims. Fourth, the logic applied in race-based
associational discrimination cases, which have held that discrimination against an individual’s interracial relationship is discrimination
against that individual’s own race, should be applied to religionbased associational discrimination cases. Specifically, it may be argued that discrimination against an individual’s interfaith marriage
may, in fact, be discrimination against that individual’s religion, in
that the individual’s religion does not match his or her partner’s religion. Furthermore, if Chiara had brought a racial claim on the
ground that Jews have been historically classified as a separate race
or ethnic group, the Second Department’s exclusive analysis of two
federal race-based associational discrimination cases would have
been justified because it would have been unnecessary to address the
extension of associational discrimination to other protected classes.
Fifth and finally, the EEOC has broadly interpreted Title VII to allow
religion-based associational discrimination, declaring that it is “unlawful to discriminate against a Christian because s/he is married to a
Muslim.”188 This broad interpretation should be given great deference as courts consider more non-race-based associational discrimination cases in the future. Despite all these reasons, the Second Department cited only to race-based associational cases without
187
188

Culpepper, 421 F.2d at 891.
EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 100.
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explanation as to why the logic applied in those cases apply in this
religion-based associational discrimination case. It is unclear whether Chiara suffered discrimination on the basis of his own religion, especially since many of the discriminatory comments were generalized
and did not focus on the association of Chiara’s religion and his
wife’s religion.
The Second Department only briefly touched upon the viability of a First Amendment right to intimate association argument. Applying the logic of the Second Circuit in Matusick, it is clear that the
Town of New Castle violated Chiara’s right to intimate association
because the Town of New Castle had no legitimate interest in interfering with that relationship through its discriminatory conduct.
However, the Second Department’s lack of a detailed discussion did
not help to clarify the history of the right to intimate association and
the disagreement over the standard of scrutiny to be applied.
The Second Department’s decision that Chiara should be considered a member of a protected class based upon his wife’s religion
under the New York State Human Rights Law is a commendable,
noteworthy decision because it furthers the purpose of combating
discrimination in the workplace. Though courts across the country
have not yet widely considered non-race-based associational discrimination claims, it does not follow that such claims should be dismissed for lack of precedent because discrimination, in any form, is
abhorrent and should not be tolerated under any circumstance. It is
crucial that courts develop consistent standards and rationales for
such claims in order for anti-discrimination legislation to evolve and
flourish for all protected classes across the country. Though the Second Department’s ultimate conclusion in Chiara is correct, its lack of
explanation contributes to the difficulty for other courts in New York
and across the country to address non-race-based associational discrimination claims into the future.
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